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INSURMOUNTABLE HILL: HOW UNDUE 
AEDPA DEFERENCE HAS UNDERMINED 
THE ATKINS BAN ON EXECUTING THE 
INTELLECTUALLY DISABLED 
Abstract: On November 22, 2011, in Hill v. Humphrey, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, held that a petitioner’s 
federal habeas petition challenging his death sentence must be denied 
in light of the degree of deference owed to the state habeas court’s de-
cision under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(AEDPA). In so doing, the court rejected the petitioner’s argument that 
Georgia’s beyond a reasonable doubt standard for proving a defendant’s 
intellectual disability is unconstitutionally stringent and thus eviscerates 
the right of the intellectually disabled to be exempt from capital punish-
ment, a right clearly constitutionalized by the U.S. Supreme Court in At-
kins v. Virginia. This Comment argues that the majority’s overly strict ap-
proach in Hill has produced an unduly deferential standard for federal 
review of state court decisions. Consequently, under this approach, im-
portant constitutional protections—like that exempting the intellectually 
disabled from execution—are denied without recourse. 
Introduction 
 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) 
established a stringent level of deference that federal habeas courts 
must afford state court decisions.1 Under AEDPA, federal habeas relief 
following state court adjudications is severely circumscribed and cannot 
be granted unless the adjudication meets one of two exceptions.2 The 
first of these is that adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary 
to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Fed-
eral law.”3 Courts struggle with how to interpret this statutory language, 
                                                                                                                      
1 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(d)(1) (2006); see Samuel R. Wiseman, Habeas After Pinholster, 53 B.C. L. Rev. 953, 960 
(2012) (“Under AEDPA, a federal court may consider granting habeas relief to an individual 
in state custody under very limited circumstances.”). 
2 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Katherine A. McAllister, Comment, Deferential Dilemmas: 
Pinholster v. Ayers and Federal Habeas Claims for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel After AEDPA, 52 B.C. L. 
Rev. E. Supp. 121, 127 (2011), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol52/iss6/11. 
3 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). AEDPA contains a second exception for adjudications that “re-
sulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of 
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often disagreeing on (1) whether something is clearly established under 
federal law, and if so, (2) whether a state decision is “contrary to, or in-
volve[s] an unreasonable application of” that federal law.4 Grappling 
with these interpretive questions, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit held, in 2012, in Hill v. Humphrey (Hill IV ), that a peti-
tioner’s federal habeas petition must be denied in light of the degree of 
deference owed to the state habeas court’s prior decision under 
AEDPA.5 
 Part I of this Comment summarizes the factual and procedural 
history of Hill IV.6 Part II discusses the reasoning underling the Hill IV 
majority’s conclusions and explains the degree of deference owed to 
state habeas courts’ decisions under AEDPA and recent U.S. Supreme 
Court decisions.7 Finally, Part III argues that the en banc majority’s 
overly deferential approach to AEDPA claims is mistaken as it abdicates 
an essential function of federal habeas courts and effectively eviscerates 
the constitutional ban against executing the intellectually disabled.8 
I. Hill’s Journey Through the Courts and Fruitless Request 
for Federal Habeas Relief 
 In 1993, a Georgia jury convicted Warren Lee Hill, Jr. of murder-
ing a fellow inmate while he was serving a life sentence and unanimous-
ly sentenced him to death.9 After an unsuccessful direct appeal to the 
                                                                                                                      
the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Id. § 2254(d)(2). This Comment 
focuses on the first exception. 
4 See, e.g., Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73−77 (2003) (holding—in a 5-4 decision—
that federal habeas review would not be granted because the defendant’s sentence of twen-
ty-five years to life in prison for a “third strike” conviction was not contrary to, nor an un-
reasonable application of, clearly established federal law); Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 
336 (1997) (commenting that “in a world of silk purses and pigs’ ears, [AEDPA] is not a 
silk purse of the art of statutory drafting”); see also Larry W. Yackle, Federal Courts: 
Habeas Corpus 113 (2d ed. 2003) (“AEDPA is notorious for poor drafting that frustrates 
the Court’s textualist approach to statutory construction.”); John H. Blume, AEDPA: The 
“Hype” and the “Bite,” 91 Cornell L. Rev. 259, 272−73 (2006) (“[AEDPA’s] statutory lan-
guage had no habeas pedigree . . . . [T]he federal courts were forced to divine its meaning 
from scratch.”); Evan Tsen Lee, Section 2254(d) of the New Habeas Statute: An (Opinionated) 
User's Manual, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 103, 104 (1998) (“[N]o aspect of the statute poses greater 
or deeper interpretational problems than the new section 2254(d), which governs the way 
in which federal habeas courts are to regard state court adjudications.”). 
5 See Hill v. Humphrey (Hill IV ), 662 F.3d 1335, 1360−61 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc), 
cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2727 (2012). 
6 See infra notes 9−24 and accompanying text. 
7 See infra notes 25−36 and accompanying text. 
8 See infra notes 37−75 and accompanying text. 
9 Hill v. State (Hill I ), 427 S.E.2d 770, 772 (Ga. 1993). 
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Georgia Supreme Court, Hill filed a state habeas petition challenging 
his death sentence, claiming for the first time that he was intellectually 
disabled and thus ineligible for capital punishment.10 Under Georgia 
state law, a defendant raising an intellectual disability claim bears the 
burden of proving his disability beyond a reasonable doubt.11 Notwith-
standing this statute, the state habeas court initially employed a pre-
ponderance of the evidence standard and determined that Hill was in-
tellectually disabled.12 On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court vacated 
the state habeas court’s decision and concluded that according to 
Georgia law, Hill’s intellectual disability status must be evaluated under 
the stricter reasonable doubt standard.13 Under this higher standard, 
the state habeas court, on remand, determined that Hill failed to prove 
his intellectual disability.14 As a result, the court denied Hill’s state ha-
beas petition, thereby effectively affirming his death sentence.15 
 Barely one month after the state habeas court ultimately denied 
Hill’s petition, in 2002, in Atkins v. Virginia, the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that the execution of an intellectually disabled person is unconsti-
tutional.16 In light of this decision, Hill filed a federal habeas petition in 
the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Georgia challenging 
his death sentence under AEDPA.17 The gravamen of Hill’s claim was 
that Georgia’s reasonable doubt burden is unconstitutional because the 
stringent standard makes it practically impossible to prove intellectual 
disability so as to invoke Atkins’ protection.18 
                                                                                                                      
10 Turpin v. Hill (Hill II ), 498 S.E.2d 52, 52−53 (Ga. 1998). This Comment uses the term 
“intellectual disability” in lieu of “mental retardation” in recognition of the latter term’s offen-
sive implications. Cf. Press Release, The White House, Statement by the Press Secretary (Oct. 
5, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/10/05/statement- 
press-secretary-10510 (indicating federal statutory changes from using “mental retardation” to 
“intellectual disability”). 
11 Ga. Code Ann. § 17-7-131(c)(3), ( j) (2011). 
12 Hill II, 498 S.E.2d at 54. 
13 Id.; see Ga. Code Ann. § 17-7-131(c)(3), ( j). 
14 Hill IV, 662 F.3d at 1340−41. 
15 Hill II, 498 S.E.2d at 54. 
16 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). More specifically, Atkins held that the 
execution of a “mentally retarded” person was unconstitutional. See id. But see supra note 10 
(explaining this Comment’s choice of terminology). 
17 Hill IV, 662 F.3d at 1342. Prior to petitioning for federal habeas review, Hill first 
sought reconsideration by the state habeas court in light of the Supreme Court’s Atkins 
decision. Id. at 1341. Although the state habeas court was again initially receptive to Hill’s 
claim, the Georgia Supreme Court ultimately ordered the state habeas court to reinstate its 
May 2002 order affirming Hill’s death sentence. Id. at 1342. 
18 See id. at 1342−43. 
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 The district court denied Hill’s petition but granted Hill’s request 
for a certificate of appealability to the Eleventh Circuit on his intellec-
tual disability claim.19 On appeal, a panel of the Eleventh Circuit re-
versed the district court’s denial, determining that despite AEDPA’s 
required deference, Georgia’s reasonable doubt standard was contrary 
to clearly established federal law and unconstitutional because it facili-
tated the execution of the intellectually disabled.20 Accordingly, the 
court concluded that a less stringent standard should have been used to 
evaluate Hill’s intellectual disability claim.21 
 After a rehearing en banc, however, the Eleventh Circuit vacated 
the panel’s decision and reinstated the district court’s judgment sus-
taining Georgia’s reasonable doubt standard.22 The en banc majority 
reasoned that AEDPA demands substantial deference to prior decisions 
of a state habeas court, and accordingly the Georgia Supreme Court’s 
decision affirming the state’s reasonable doubt standard must not be 
disturbed.23 As such, the Eleventh Circuit reinstated Hill’s death sen-
tence.24 
II. The En Banc Majority’s Approach to AEDPA Review 
 In Hill IV, a majority of the Eleventh Circuit sitting en banc con-
cluded that the Georgia state habeas court’s decision could not be 
overturned given the degree of deference due to such a decision under 
AEDPA.25 Reasoning that the state habeas court’s decision upholding 
Georgia’s reasonable doubt standard for capital defendants’ intellectu-
al disability claims was not contrary to clearly established federal law, 
the court determined that the decision must not be disturbed.26 The 
                                                                                                                      
19 Hill v. Schofield (Hill III ), 608 F.3d 1272, 1275 (11th Cir.), vacated, Hill IV, 662 F.3d 
1335 (11th Cir. 2010). To challenge the denial of a federal habeas petition, a petitioner 
must first obtain a “certificate of appealability” (COA) from a circuit or district judge. 28 
U.S.C. § 2253(c) (2006). To obtain a COA, a petitioner must make “a substantial showing 
of the denial of a constitutional right.” Id. § 2253(c)(2); Pagan v. United States, 353 F.3d 
1343, 1346 (11th Cir. 2003). 
20 See Hill III, 608 F.3d at 1273–74 (“We conclude that because Georgia’s requirement 
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt necessarily will result in the execution of the mentally 
retarded, the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision is contrary to the clearly established rule 
of Atkins.”). 
21 See id. at 1283 & n.11. 
22 Hill IV, 662 F.3d at 1343, 1360. 
23 See id. at 1360−61. 
24 See id. 
25 Hill v. Humphrey (Hill IV ), 662 F.3d 1335, 1360 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. de-
nied, 132 S. Ct. 2727 (2012). 
26 See id. at 1343, 1360. 
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majority further reasoned that the AEDPA standard is strict by design 
and is not meant to be used as a typical means of error correction.27 
Instead, the high bar exists only as a “guard against extreme malfunc-
tions in the state criminal justice systems.”28 
 In reaching its conclusion, the majority relied upon several recent 
U.S. Supreme Court decisions that reversed circuit appellate courts for 
not adhering to AEDPA’s requirements.29 The Supreme Court has ex-
pressed three key tenets of interpreting an AEDPA claim: (1) for a fed-
eral law to be clearly established, it must be embodied in a Supreme 
Court holding;30 (2) “an unreasonable application of federal law is differ-
ent from an incorrect application of federal law”;31 and (3) a state court’s 
determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief 
unless no “fairminded jurists” could agree with the court’s decision.32 
 Applying these precepts to the intellectual disability context, the 
majority determined that nothing in the Atkins v. Virginia decision 
mandated a particular burden of proof for assessing the intellectual 
disability claims for capital defendants.33 Because the Atkins court de-
liberately left to the states the task of devising appropriate procedures 
for intellectual disability determinations, there was no clearly estab-
lished law controlling the issue.34 Further, the majority concluded that 
at the very least, fair-minded jurists could certainly agree with the in-
terpretation of the Georgia Supreme Court—which upheld the state’s 
reasonable doubt standard—and thus the decision was not contrary to 
clearly established federal law.35 Finding no error beyond any possibility 
of fair-minded disagreement, the majority considered it proper to leave 
the state habeas decision undisturbed.36 
                                                                                                                      
27 See id. at 1347. 
28 Id. (quoting Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38, 43 (2011)). 
29 Id. at 1343−47; see infra notes 30–32 and accompanying text. 
30 See Thaler v. Haynes, 130 S. Ct. 1171, 1173 (2010). 
31 See Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 
362, 410 (2000)). 
32 See Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 
541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 
33 Hill IV, 662 F.3d at 1348 (“Atkins simply did not consider or reach the burden of 
proof issue, and neither has any subsequent Supreme Court opinion.”). 
34 Id.; see also Bobby v. Bies, 556 U.S. 825, 831 (2009) (“Our opinion did not provide de-
finitive procedural or substantive guides for determining when a person who claims mental 
retardation ‘will be so impaired as to fall [within Atkins’ compass].’” (alteration in original) 
(quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002))); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 (“[W]e leave 
to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional re-
striction.”). 
35 Hill IV, 662 F.3d at 1360. 
36 Id. 
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III. The Majority’s Misconceived Hyper-Deferential Standard 
Endangers Constitutional Rights 
 The Hill IV majority’s literal and narrow reading of AEDPA’s re-
quirements improperly enabled the court to shirk its duty as a defender 
of constitutional rights.37 The AEDPA deference standard should not 
be construed so indomitably high as to foreclose federal habeas courts 
from conducting independent review of important constitutional 
claims.38 The majority’s highly deferential conception of AEDPA review 
stripped the federal habeas court of its all-important function of being 
an ultimate check on the justice system.39 Although AEDPA sought to 
curtail the discretion of federal judges and discourage the use of collat-
eral attacks on constitutional infirmities, a more pragmatic approach to 
interpreting the deference AEDPA demands would better serve its in-
tended purpose.40 In essence, the majority transformed AEDPA beyond 
its intended housekeeping function of deterring frivolous appeals, and 
in so doing, deprived the federal court system of its ability to effectively 
ensure state court compliance with constitutional law.41 Consequently, 
if the Eleventh Circuit and other courts continue to follow this ap-
proach, many strong constitutional claims will go unheard, and count-
less individuals may have their rights violated without recourse in the 
federal courts.42 
                                                                                                                      
37 See Hill v. Humphrey (Hill IV ), 662 F.3d 1335, 1367 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc) 
(Barkett, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2727 (2012); id. at 1378 (Wilson, J., dissent-
ing); id. at 1381−82 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
38 See Hill IV, 662 F.3d at 1385 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
39 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; Hill IV, 662 F.3d at 1385 (Martin, J., dissenting); see 
also William J. Brennan, Jr., Federal Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners: An Exercise in Federalism, 
7 Utah L. Rev. 423, 441 (1961) (“[W]hen state courts insist upon literal compliance with 
state procedures as the price of relief from the deprivation of fundamental rights, it is hard 
to see any basis in this for automatic preclusion from relief in federal habeas corpus.”). 
40 See Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 Buff. L. Rev. 381, 
398 (1996) (discussing the Senate debate surrounding AEDPA, including Senator Orrin 
Hatch’s supportive claim that AEDPA would “correct some of the deficiencies” in the cur-
rent scheme and limit “frivolous appeals,” yet do so “while still preserving and protecting 
the constitutional rights of those who are accused”); see also Recent Case, Hill v. Humphrey, 
662 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc), 125 Harv. L. Rev. 2185, 2190 & n.58 (2012) (argu-
ing that Congress meant to preserve a degree of habeas protection in drafting AEDPA, 
“not strip prisoners of their right to meaningful review of their federal constitutional 
claims” (quoting Claudia Wilner, Note, “We Would Not Defer to That Which Did Not Exist”: 
AEDPA Meets the Silent State Court Opinion, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1442, 1459 (2002))). 
41 Wilner, supra note 40, at 1459 (noting that in passing AEDPA, Congress undoubtedly 
“wanted the federal courts to continue their longstanding practice of protecting prisoners’ 
federal constitutional rights where the state courts failed to do so”). 
42 See id. 
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 Section A of this Part suggests that the Hill IV majority was overly 
rigid in how it construed the AEDPA inquiry, phrasing the question of 
what deference is due under AEDPA.43 Section B considers the purpose 
of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins v. Virginia and argues 
that the Hill IV majority was mistaken in permitting the Georgia courts 
to eviscerate a constitutional right procedurally.44 Finally, Section C 
evaluates the Hill IV majority decision in light of the Supreme Court’s 
broader death-is-different jurisprudence.45 
A. The Hill IV Majority Was Overly Rigid in Phrasing the AEDPA Inquiry 
 In Hill IV, the majority of the Eleventh Circuit sitting en banc con-
tinued an unsettling trend among federal appellate courts of interpret-
ing AEDPA quite narrowly and rephrasing the threshold deference 
question in a manner that essentially answers itself.46 Initially, the Su-
preme Court framed the inquiry as a matter of reasonableness— 
whether AEDPA required deference to the state court’s decision hinged 
on whether that decision was “objectively reasonable.”47 As presented in 
a recent flurry of AEDPA decisions, however, the inquiry has become 
whether any fair-minded jurists could agree with the state court’s deci-
sion.48 Because it will almost invariably be the case that at least some fair-
                                                                                                                      
43 See infra notes 46–54 and accompanying text. 
44 See infra notes 55–67 and accompanying text. 
45 See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (“[T]he penalty of death is differ-
ent in kind from any other punishment imposed under our system of criminal justice.”); 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286–87 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (explaining that 
the death penalty is “a unique punishment in the United States” that is “unusual in its pain, 
in its finality, and in its enormity”); Meghan J. Ryan, Does Stare Decisis Apply in the Eighth Amend-
ment Death Penalty Context?, 85 N.C. L. Rev. 847, 858 (2007) (explaining that Justice William 
Brennan’s concurrence in Furman v. Georgia is credited as the source of the reasoning behind 
death-is-different jurisprudence); infra notes 68–75 and accompanying text. 
46 See Hill IV, 662 F.3d at 1347 (“[T]his Court cannot find that highest state court’s habe-
as decision unreasonable unless no fairminded jurist could agree with that [state] court’s deci-
sion.”) (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
47 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409 (2000). 
48 Compare Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004) (denying federal habeas re-
view because the state court’s determination was “objectively reasonable” despite the fact that 
“fairminded jurists” could agree with the state court), and Williams, 529 U.S. at 409 (“Defin-
ing an ‘unreasonable application’ by reference to a ‘reasonable jurist,’ however, is of little 
assistance to the courts that must apply § 2254(d)(1) and, in fact, may be misleading. Stated 
simply, a federal habeas court making the ‘unreasonable application’ inquiry should ask 
whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law was objectively unrea-
sonable.”), with Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (“Under § 2254(d), a habe-
as court must determine what arguments or theories supported or, as here, could have sup-
ported, the state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists 
could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior 
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minded jurists will agree, the federal courts will rarely find it proper to 
intervene under this estranged conception.49 
 Not only is this threshold question phrased in a manner that essen-
tially compels deference to the state court’s decision, but it also marks a 
significant departure from the Supreme Court’s initial interpretation of 
AEDPA deference, which was far more receptive to defendants with 
strong constitutional claims.50 In 2000, in Williams v. Taylor, the Su-
preme Court defined its role as assessing whether the state court’s ap-
plication of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable.51 
As made explicit by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor in her concurring 
opinion, “[t]he federal habeas court should not transform the inquiry 
into a subjective one” that would preclude federal habeas review when-
ever “at least one of the Nation’s jurists” has applied the state court’s 
approach.52 Short of de novo review, this initial conception of AEDPA 
deference provided federal habeas courts with the necessary discretion 
to correct unreasonable constitutional infirmities.53 Unfortunately for 
defendants like Hill, this natural reading of AEDPA has succumbed to 
the narrow, hyper-deferential conception adopted by the Hill IV majori-
ty.54 
B. Georgia’s Reasonable Doubt Standard Undermines Atkins 
 Moreover, Georgia’s uniquely stringent reasonable doubt stand-
ard55 violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and thus the 
Eleventh Circuit was free to correct this constitutional infirmity regard-
                                                                                                                      
decision of this Court.” (emphasis added)), and Bobby v. Dixon, 132 S. Ct. 26, 27 (2011) 
(“Under [AEDPA], a state prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court ‘must 
show that the state court's ruling . . . was so lacking in justification that there was an error well 
understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disa-
greement.’” (emphasis added)), and Loggins v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1204, 1220 (11th Cir. 2011) 
(“[I]f some fairminded jurists could agree with the state court’s decision, although others 
might disagree, federal habeas relief must be denied.” (emphasis added)). 
49 Blume, supra note 4, at 284 (noting that “AEDPA has made habeas relief even more 
difficult for state prisoners to obtain in the lower federal courts”). 
50 See Williams, 529 U.S. at 378 (“Congress surely did not intend that the views of one 
such judge who might think that relief is not warranted in a particular case should always 
have greater weight than the contrary, considered judgment of several other reasonable 
judges.”). 
51 Id. at 377–78 (emphasis added). 
52 Id. at 409–10 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment). 
53 See id. 
54 See, e.g., Dixon, 132 S. Ct. at 27; Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786; Hill IV, 662 F.3d at 1347 
(emphasizing that AEDPA demands substantial deference). 
55 See Hill IV, 662 F.3d at 1365 n.1 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (“Georgia is the only state to 
require proof of mental retardation beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
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less of how the threshold question was phrased.56 The Eighth Amend-
ment—extended to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment—
guarantees that no government body shall impose “cruel and unusual 
punishment” on its citizens.57 In 2002, in Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme 
Court constitutionalized the substantive protection that exempts intel-
lectually disabled people from capital punishment.58 Although Atkins 
applies to all intellectually disabled people, Georgia’s reasonable doubt 
standard effectively ensures that many of these individuals will be eligi-
ble for execution nonetheless based on their inability to satisfy Geor-
gia’s standard of proof.59 
 The elusive nature of the intellectual disability prognosis ensures 
that there will always be competing evidence—including expert testi-
mony—regarding a defendant’s mental status.60 The unfortunate con-
sequence of this reality is that a great number of borderline cases—the 
mildly intellectually disabled—will be denied this constitutional protec-
tion.61 Consequently, although Atkins protects all intellectually disabled 
individuals, under the majority’s conception of the burden of proof, 
only those who are severely and profoundly intellectually disabled will 
actually benefit from the protection.62 
 Although Atkins did not specifically establish a singularly accepted 
burden of proof for intellectual disability claims, it nonetheless limited 
the standard of review by setting a “constitutional floor.”63 The Hill IV 
majority failed to recognize that states must ensure that they do not pro-
cedurally eviscerate constitutional rights through insufficient procedural 
                                                                                                                      
56 See Hill IV, 662 F.3d at 1370 (Barkett, J., dissenting). 
57 U.S. Const. amend. VIII; U.S. Const. amend. XIV. 
58 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002); see supra note 16 (noting Atkin’s use of 
different terminology). 
59 See id.; Hill IV, 662 F.3d at 1370–71 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (“Requiring the mentally 
retarded to prove their mental retardation beyond any reasonable doubt will inevitably 
lead, through the rule’s natural operation, to the frequent execution of mentally retarded 
individuals . . . .”). 
60 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 430 (1979) (“The subtleties and nuances of psy-
chiatric diagnosis render certainties virtually beyond reach in most situations.”); see Hill IV, 
662 F.3d at 1371 (Barkett, J., dissenting). 
61 Hill IV, 662 F.3d at 1367 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (“That a mildly mentally retarded 
individual’s ‘mental deficiencies’ are less ‘significant’ than the deficits of one who is se-
verely or profoundly mentally retarded does not alter the indisputable fact that both are 
mentally retarded and entitled to the protection of the Eighth Amendment. Indeed, the 
offender in Atkins himself was only mildly mentally retarded.”). 
62 Id. (highlighting the unsettling irony that the majority of intellectually disabled in-
dividuals fit into the mildly disabled category, and thus these individuals are most likely to 
require Atkins protection). 
63 See id. at 1380 (Wilson, J., dissenting). 
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schemes.64 By setting its burden of proof unreachably high, Georgia ef-
fectively nullified the exemption from capital punishment that Atkins 
provided to the intellectually disabled.65 Because “deciding a constitu-
tional entitlement using a standard of proof foreclosed by Supreme 
Court precedent constitutes a decision that is ‘contrary to’ federal law,” 
the Eleventh Circuit was free to determine that Georgia’s reasonable 
doubt standard is unconstitutional.66 Instead, it refused to review Hill’s 
federal claim based on misconceptions of AEDPA deference.67 
C. Extreme AEDPA Deference Contradicts Death-Is-Different Jurisprudence 
 Finally, the Hill IV majority’s extreme deference to state court deci-
sions under AEDPA runs counter to the Supreme Court’s death-is-
different jurisprudence.68 A survey of death penalty jurisprudence re-
veals a broad trend toward limiting capital punishment and carving out 
more and more exceptions curtailing its use.69 The impetus behind this 
movement has been the recognition that death is different than all 
other forms of punishment.70 Due to the severity and finality of capital 
                                                                                                                      
64 See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 521 (1958) (establishing that states must provide 
“procedures which are adequate to safeguard against infringement of constitutionally pro-
tected rights”). 
65 See Hill IV, 662 F.3d at 1370–71 (Barkett, J., dissenting). 
66 Id. at 1366 n.2. 
67 See id. at 1377–78 (“Atkins has recognized the federal constitutional right of mentally 
retarded offenders not to be executed. Georgia, therefore, cannot indirectly authorize the 
execution of mentally retarded offenders through a procedure that in practical operation 
accomplishes that result.”); see also Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 239 (1911) (establish-
ing that state procedures are unconstitutional if they transgress a substantive constitutional 
right in their natural operation). 
68 See supra note 49 and accompanying text; infra notes 69–75 and accompanying text. 
69 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 413 (2008) (holding that it is unconstitu-
tional to execute for the offense of rape of a child); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 
(2005) (holding that it is unconstitutional to execute juveniles); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (hold-
ing that it is unconstitutional to execute the intellectually disabled); Enmund v. Florida, 458 
U.S. 782, 798 (1982) (holding that it is unconstitutional to execute for the offense of felony 
murder); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 599 (1977) (holding that it is unconstitutional to 
execute for the offense of rape of a woman); Bruce J. Winick, The Supreme Court’s Evolving 
Death Penalty Jurisprudence: Severe Mental Illness as the Next Frontier, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 785, 792 
(2009) (suggesting that the Supreme Court’s recent death penalty cases indicate that the 
Court will soon find the execution of mentally ill offenders unconstitutionally disproportion-
ate because it does not adequately serve the goals of retribution or deterrence). 
70 Jeffrey Abramson, Death-Is-Different Jurisprudence and the Role of the Capital Jury, 2 Ohio 
St. J. Crim. L. 117, 117–19 (2004) (“One of the enduring arguments in Supreme Court 
death penalty jurisprudence is that the death penalty is ‘qualitatively different’ from all other 
punishments in ways that require extraordinary procedural protection against error.”); see, 
e.g., Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 614 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[T]he Eighth 
Amendment requires States to apply special procedural safeguards when they seek the death 
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punishment, procedural schemes that facilitate imposing the death 
penalty must be carefully crafted to ensure that they do not undermine 
constitutional values.71 Federal habeas review has historically been an 
important channel through which capital defendants have successfully 
raised strong constitutional claims.72 Despite this long history, the Elev-
enth Circuit majority in Hill IV read AEDPA in a way that severely lim-
ited the role of the federal court system in protecting constitutional 
rights.73 Although Congress meant to limit and demystify the federal 
habeas review process by passing AEDPA, it is doubtful that AEDPA was 
meant to demand such deference to state court decisions as to deprive 
the federal habeas review process of its force or to leave those with wor-
thy constitutional claims without recourse.74 In light of the Supreme 
Court’s recognition that death is different, the federal court system 
should remain especially vigilant in its protection of constitutional 
rights when the death penalty is at issue.75 
Conclusion 
 In Hill IV, the Eleventh Circuit sitting en banc concluded that the 
Georgia Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the state’s reasonable 
doubt standard for intellectual disability claims was not contrary to 
clearly established federal law. The court did so by holding that Atkins 
did not establish a singularly acceptable burden of proof for such claims 
and, thus, fair-minded jurists could disagree as to the proper standard of 
review. As such, the court considered itself bound by AEDPA-imposed 
deference to allow the state decision to stand and, in effect, affirm Hill’s 
death sentence. In coming to this conclusion, however, the Eleventh 
Circuit misconstrued AEDPA’s effect on the federal habeas review pro-
cess in a manner that has stripped this review of its potency, leaving it 
but a rubber stamp for unchecked state court decisions. 
 By failing to reject Georgia’s reasonable doubt standard, the Hill IV 
majority has enshrined a standard of review that ensures that many 
                                                                                                                      
penalty.”); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 340 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]his 
Court has consistently acknowledged the uniqueness of the punishment of death.”); 
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 468 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (“[T]he death penalty is qualitatively different from any other punishment, and 
hence must be accompanied by unique safeguards.”). 
71 See Abramson, supra note 70, at 118–19. 
72 See Wilner, supra note 40, at 1459. 
73 See Hill IV, 662 F.3d at 1385 (Martin, J., dissenting); Wilner, supra note 40, at 1459. 
74 See Brennan, supra note 39, at 441; Yackle, supra note 40, at 398–401. 
75 See Abramson, supra note 70, at 118. 
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mildly intellectually disabled individuals will be eligible for the death 
penalty despite their constitutional exemption from capital punish-
ment. Although AEDPA was passed in part to curtail frivolous claims 
and economize judicial proceedings, it was not meant to gut the federal 
habeas system of its bite and leave those with important constitutional 
claims without recourse. In light of the broad trend of death-is-different 
jurisprudence that has consistently limited the applicability of the 
death penalty over the past thirty-five years, AEDPA’s call for deference 
to state court decisions should not prevent federal habeas courts from 
rectifying constitutional infirmities. In accordance with their important 
historical function, federal habeas courts must not stumble over an un-
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